Why Rare Earths Are Not Actually Rare

“Rare earth” sounds like a geological shortage. It is a historical name for a family of metallic elements first isolated from unusual minerals and identified in oxide form—the old chemical “earths”. Many are more common in the crust than familiar industrial metals.

USGS defines the group as scandium, yttrium and the 15 lanthanides. Cerium averages about 60 parts per million in the crust, while even the least abundant members are far more common than gold. The difficulty is that they rarely gather in rich, easily mined deposits.¹

Rare-earth power comes from concentration, separation and manufacturing—not from elemental rarity alone.

Seventeen elements share one misleading label

The group includes light and heavy rare earths with different properties and markets. Neodymium and praseodymium help make powerful permanent magnets. Dysprosium and terbium can help those magnets withstand heat. Cerium polishes glass and supports catalysts. Europium and terbium produce specialised colours. Treating all 17 as one commodity hides these differences.

Abundance is not a mine

A deposit must contain the right mix at sufficient concentration, in minerals that can be processed, at a site that can secure permits, infrastructure, water, energy, finance and buyers. USGS estimated 2025 world mine production at 390,000 tonnes of rare-earth-oxide equivalent: China produced 270,000 tonnes, the United States 51,000 and Australia 29,000.²

The strategic bottleneck starts after mining

Ore is crushed, milled and concentrated. Chemical treatment creates a mixed rare-earth feed. Separation isolates individual oxides; refining converts them into metals; alloying and precision manufacturing create magnets. Each link needs specialised plants, trained operators, waste systems, qualification and steady demand.

Separation is difficult because the elements resemble one another

Rare-earth ions have similar chemistry. Industrial separation may repeat extraction and transfer through many stages to tease apart small differences. That creates a less visible barrier to entry: process knowledge, plant tuning, reagent management and environmental control accumulated over years.

A tiny magnet moves a much larger machine

Neodymium-iron-boron magnets create strong magnetic fields with relatively little mass. They appear in vehicle traction motors, wind turbines, industrial robots, data-centre drives, consumer electronics and defence systems. The material cost can be a small share of a final machine, yet its absence can halt the entire production line.

China’s advantage grows at every downstream step

The IEA estimates that for the four rare earths central to high-performance magnets, China held 60 percent of mining, 91 percent of refining and 94 percent of sintered permanent-magnet production in 2024.³ The widening shares show why opening a mine elsewhere does not by itself diversify the magnet supply chain.

An export licence turns industrial capacity into leverage

In April 2025, China placed export controls on specified samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium items, including certain magnets and compounds. Exporters must apply for licences; the measure is not formally a blanket ban.⁴ China said in May 2026 that compliant civilian applications continued to be reviewed.⁵

Diversification needs a portfolio, not one new mine

Alternative supply requires mines, separation capacity, metal and alloy plants, magnet factories and customers willing to qualify new material. Recycling reduces waste and can recover material from motors and electronics, but USGS still describes rare-earth recycling as limited. Substitution and product redesign can lower exposure, although performance, weight and cost may change.

The elements are not rare. A qualified, scalable and trusted route from rock to magnet is.

Sources and further reading